But they’re solving them in very different ways. In Russia, politics is a free-for-all, with Yeltsin’s supporters and foes (grouped around Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi) accusing each other of massive corruption and dictatorial aspirations. There are no generally accepted rules, no consensus on who should have what powers and no stability in the country’s basic political institutions. Poland is faring much better. As chaotic as Polish politics can be, people play by the new rules of the game. The press, the parties and the politicians generally behave themselves. That stability is critical for Walesa, as be tries to stave off a challenge from the old communists and their allies in parliamentary elections on Sept. 19. After years of combating the status quo, now Walesa is hoping the new rules will work for him.

Yeltsin may have helped. He delighted his host by expressing his “understanding” of the Polish drive for NATO membership, something many Kremlin officials have long opposed. Walesa hopes that if the Kremlin doesn’t mind, the Clinton administration won’t, either. In fact, joining the Western defense alliance will be far from automatic-but Yeltsin’s concession was nevertheless a triumph for Walesa, who wants to draw his country closer to the advanced nations. The Russian leader also dropped off a package of secret Kremlin documents that embarrassed Walesa’s leftist rivals.

These transcripts of Soviet Politburo meetings contained a stunning disclosure about Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Polish communist leader who declared martial law in 1981 and tried to quash Solidarity–and Walesa with it. Jaruzelski has always maintained that he acted to forestall any direct Soviet intervention, but the transcript of a Kremlin meeting three days before he announced martial law tells a different story. “Jaruzelski says that if Polish forces do not cope with the resistance of ‘S’ [Solidarity] then the Polish comrades are hoping for help from other countries through the introduction of armed forces into Polish territory,” a senior official reported. The Politburo decided to reject the request, insisting that the Poles had to handle the crackdown by themselves. “We will have to try to dampen the desire of Jaruzelski and other Polish leaders to introduce troops,” KGB chief Yuri Andropov asserted. Jaruzelski indignantly protested the “obvious manipulation” of the transcript, calling the charge that he sought Soviet intervention “stupid and shameful.” He cited other excerpts to argue that the Soviet leaders knew he was playing a convoluted double game. In one such passage, chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov says: “At the same time, the Poles clearly declare that they are against the introduction of troops.”

Yeltsin only wishes that he could embarrass Russia’s communists as decisively. Unlike Walesa, he has failed to develop the political climate that would enable him to do so. His best opportunity came in August 1991, in the wake of the botched coup. He could have taken advantage of his popularity to dissolve Parliament, which was elected under the old system, and declare elections for a new one; such an initiative would have helped weed out weak political parties and bolstered the strong ones. New elections would also have given the Parliament the legitimacy it lacks today. Instead, Yeltsin banked on the old Parliament to lend him the support he needed as he attempted to rule by decree–a big mistake.

In contrast to Yeltsin, who is trying “to have more personal power as president,” Walesa told NEWSWEEK, “I, with full premeditation, have chosen a different concept…[to] let the democratic system win.“Walesa’s critics may sneer at the self-serving nature of such remarks. in fact, he has often demanded more powers and been impatient with sticking by the rules. Back in 1991 when he, too, was bogged down with a transitional Parliament that hadn’t been freely elected, Walesa mused aloud: “I wonder if evolution from communism to democracy is possible, or whether other tough methods are needed.” But Walesa kept his frustrations in check and did not try any legally dubious measures to dissolve the Parliament, waiting instead for public pressure to produce the same result. The next Parliament eventually ran out of steam, too. But Walesa did not dissolve it until be had the legal power to do so, after Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka’s government lost a no-confidence vote last May.

In the current electoral contest, Walesa has launched his own political movement–something that he claims is less than a full-fledged presidential party–to field candidates who back his positions. To those who suspect him of closet authoritarianism, the group’s recruitment of candidates from the military and police is particularly worrisome. Walesa counters that he is seeking to forge as broad a movement as possible to increase the chances that a coalition can be formed after the elections–and reforms can continue. Despite Poland’s remarkable success in reviving economic output and stimulating private enterprise. growing anger at rising unemployment (now 15 percent) and cutbacks in social benefits have prompted a backlash. The prime beneficiaries are the former communists, who argue they will continue the reforms-but ease the pain with a bigger social-welfare net.

Walesa has pledged to honor the election results even if he and his former Solidarity colleagues are embarrassed by a victory of their old enemies. Chances are, the former communists would not be able to put together a governing coalition anyway. Faced with a similar situation, Yeltsin would almost certainly try to make an end run around the results. One acquaintance who visited Walesa recently claims that the Polish president is “fascinated” by Yeltsin’s methods; he even suggested that Walesa may feel tempted to imitate them. But so far he hasn’t. Therein lies all the difference.